

# Support for the Implementation of the Peace and Security Agenda of the Africa Union

Project No.RAF/02/018

Terminal Evaluation

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## Executive Summary of Main Findings and Conclusions:

### Introduction

Background: The UNDP project RAF/02/018 was approved in December 2002 as support to the Peace and Security Agenda of the Africa Union. An earlier project (RAF/97/028), approved in 1997 and co-financed by the UNDP and Norway, and formally identified as a “Capacity Building” project, had made valuable contributions in enhancing the capacity of the OAU Conflict Management Centre. The current Project, being financed through a much broader co-funding arrangement involving UNDP, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, has as its overriding objective to “contribute globally to *enhancing the capacity* of the AU for conflict prevention and peace building in Africa” through the provision of technical and financial assistance to the AU Peace and Security Commission.

Objectives of the Evaluation: The main objectives of the Terminal Evaluation are to assess the overall impact of the support provided under the project; evaluate the strategy underlying the design of the project; assess the activities carried out and identify the key achievements and shortcomings; assess the management of the project and determine whether it has met its objectives and targets; assess the constraints, if any, which may have affected project implementation; examine the partnerships built for the project; evaluate the performance of the project in mobilizing resources in support of the Peace and Security agenda; record significant lessons learnt from the implementation of the project; identify the successes and difficulties of the UNDP mission to date; make recommendations on how the project can develop its exit strategy; and to review the extent to which the recommendations of the Mid-Term Evaluation were taken into account.

### Main Findings

Project Overall Impact: Consultations with the project’s main client (the Peace and Security Department of the AU--PSD), confirm that the overall impact of the project has been very positive. The accessibility of the project resources and, especially, the speed with which resources made available under the Project can be mobilized, greatly enhance the value of the Project to the Department. The Project has made available human resources who now constitute an integral core staff for the Peace and Security Department. The Project has also enabled the establishment of critical elements of the African Peace and Security Architecture, has improved the productivity of Commission staff, and has enabled better information flow between the Commission and conflict zones. Additionally, the Project has enabled the Department of the Peace and Security Commission to concentrate on its core business of Conflict Prevention and Management by assuming an increasing number of routine and time consuming but essential reporting tasks. Finally, the Project provides additional financial resources which can be utilized with a great deal of flexibility.

Three areas were identified by officials of the Commission as prime candidates for more and better focus for the Project. These were: skills development and transfer to the core AU Commission staff; long term capacity building to improve the Peace and Security

Commission's own structures, procedures, and processes to render them more efficient within the context of the overall AU governance structure; and assistance to the Commission to make even better use of existing and on-going research and analyses by other institutions (such as the Regional Economic Commissions) and civil society organizations on conflict prevention and maintenance.

**Project Strategy:** The Project set for itself a four-pronged **support/assistance** strategy of: strengthening the PSD in Human-resource Development, developing information systems, and the analytical capacity of the PSD. The support/assistance also cover the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and related institutions, the development of effective linkages between the Council and Regional Security Mechanisms, promoting Institutional Capacity building in preventive diplomacy through the establishment and effective operation of the continent-wide Early Warning System; and strengthening of the AU capacity for resource mobilization for its Peace Fund through assisting the AU in developing and implementing an innovative strategy of resource mobilization.

The advantage of a Support Strategy is that the strategic options to achieve the Project's objectives are, by definition, "owned" by the Project's beneficiary. The disadvantage of a Project designed as an assistance/support program is that it offers very limited scope for the "Project" to have a meaningful "strategic" or "advisory" role in defining project objectives and devising strategies to achieve them. Moreover, the Project defines the Peace and Security Council (as opposed to the member countries) as the ultimate beneficiary. Consequently, the governance structure of the Project is designed to facilitate the flow of information on the implementation of Project activities exclusively to the Commission and the Partners involved in the funding and Management of the Project. This constitutes a major problem because AU member countries are not informed about the Project's implementation nor does the Project receive a regular feedback from the member countries on the usefulness of the Project's contribution such as the Local Area Network, and the activities and deliveries of the Situation Room.

**Assessment of Project Activities:** An analysis by the Review Team of the breakdown of the Work Plan of the project confirms the design of the Project as a technical and financial assistance Project to **enhance the capacity** of the PSC rather than a strictly speaking "capacity building" project. Moreover, to the extent that the AU, in general and the Peace and Security Commission in particular, by their own admission would be "chronically understaffed and under-budgeted" even with the full complement of staff provided for under the Maputo Structure of the AU, the activities supported by the Project would continue to be very germane and most needed.

**Assessment of the Management of the Project:** The Project has a very light Management Structure and this would seem to be fully justified in view of the fact that the Project can and does rely on the services of the UNDP and UNOPS for recruitment and procurement services. The assessment of the Project's impact would seem to indicate that the project management structure has not in any way been a hindrance to the attainment of the objectives and may, in fact, contributed significantly to the very

positive results achieved so far. Moreover, there are indications that the Project has played a significant role in mobilizing, managing, and reporting on additional resources made available to the PSD.

**Constraints on Capacity Building:** In the traditional and strictest sense, there has been very little “capacity building” under the Project and the major constraint has been the inability of the AU to endow itself with the human resources to whom the capacity and the skills can be transferred. The reason is principally budgetary: the mismatch between resources available through the assessed budget of the AU and the (ever expanding) mandate of the Union. In short, there is no spare capacity in the AU that can be built or developed over time. This constitutes a structural constraint for which there are no easy corrective measures over and beyond the AU undertaking an analysis and implementing solutions for the resource gap issue.

**Partnership under the Project:** One of the main initial successes of the second phase of the AU-UNPD has been the expansion of the partnership from a limited one to a much broader co-funding arrangement with the UNDP playing a coordinating role. However, the Evaluation Team had reason to believe that tensions may be developing at the level of the Project and it is incumbent on the parties to this Partnership (AU, UNDP, and the other bilateral donors) to ensure these emerging tensions do not develop to such an extent that they constrain the delivery of the Project objectives.

**Resource Mobilization under the Project:** The Project has been successful in strengthening the capacity of the PSD in resource mobilization. The project was formulated at an initial budget of \$US 6.4 million has so far received pledged contributions of \$US 7.144 million from the expanded contributing partners, namely UNDP, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, Canada, Spain and the Netherlands. This excludes another \$US 2.4 Japanese component for the training of ex-child soldiers. In addition, the Project (and the staff) can justifiably claim some credit for expanding the capacity of the PSD to mobilize other partner resources which are not channeled through the Project

**Lessons Learnt.** The Peace and Security mandate of the Africa Union is ever expanding and rapidly evolving. It is unlikely that the AU would be in a position to meet the challenges of conflict prevention and maintenance through its own (material and financial) resources and budgeted staff positions in the foreseeable future. It is equally unlikely the budgeting, recruitment, and procurement procedures of the AU can be sufficiently adapted in the near future to meet the specificity and rapidly evolving demands that conflict situations inevitably impose on the Peace and Security Commission. Thus any partnership arrangement that does not address the two issues offers only a partial solution to the obvious capacity constraint of the Peace and Security Council.

**Successes and Challenges of the UNDP Mission:** The most outstanding success of the AU-UNDP mission is that the Project has managed to provide critical support (human resources, material, and financial) to the very important day to day analytical, monitoring,

and reporting, and advisory roles of the Peace and Security Commission in the area of conflict prevention and maintenance. Moreover, the Project and the partnership framework offer possibilities for resources that can be speedily mobilized to meet the challenges posed by emerging crises. The UNDP is exceptionally well positioned to undertake partner coordination and to forge the harmonization of the efforts of donor in providing assistance to the Peace and Security Department. This is, however, a difficult and challenging task which requires transparency, free flow of information on the side of the coordinator, as well as willingness of the coordinated to be informed.

**Exit Strategy:** The requirement of the Peace and Security Commission for a sizeable flow of extra-budgetary resources that can be flexibly and quickly accessed is very likely to remain in the foreseeable future. An “exit strategy” for the Project that does not destabilize the core work of the Peace and Security Department must, therefore, imperatively involve putting in place alternative strategies that would provide comparable (technical and financial) assistance and, hopefully, through mechanisms that offer the same flexibility to the PSC.

**Recommendations of the Mid-Term Evaluation:** The Terminal Evaluation Team can confirm that most of the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation that were directed to the Project Management would appear to have been implemented. In particular, all project staff is not just “assigned” to the various divisions of the Department of Peace and Security but is fully integrated into the Work Program of the Department. Moreover, “Project staff” no longer makes a distinction between “assigned responsibility” and “fire-fighting” chores because “fire-fighting” or responding to crises is part and parcel of the Peace and Security business.

### **Conclusions:**

1. The Project has proved to be an operational facility of crucial importance to the effective functioning of the core elements of the Peace and Security Architecture of AU.
2. Unlike the first phase of the Project (which was admittedly a capacity building project), the second phase is a Technical and Financial Assistance Project. The Project objectives and the strategic options to achieve the Project’s objectives are “owned” by the Peace and Security Commission.
3. The second phase of the Project does not involve much “capacity-building”. This may be explained by the fact that in an environment of scarce resources and ever increasing and unpredictable but politically sensitive operational challenges, the goal of “capacity building” can easily become ephemeral as all human and material resources are devoted to immediate crisis prevention.
4. There have been clear advantages to the partnership arrangement under the Project. In the light of this the Evaluation Team concluded that it might be a retrogressive move for some partners to “pull out” of the Project and to establish a separate “Technical Assistance Basket” for the Peace and Security Department.

5. The requirement of the Peace and Security Department for a sizeable flow of extra-budgetary resources that can be flexibly and quickly accessed is very likely to remain in the foreseeable future. Thus there will be a continuing need for strategies that would provide comparable assistance (as does the Project) and, hopefully, through arrangements that offer the same flexibility to the Peace and Security Department.

6. The Project defines the Peace and Security Department (as opposed to the member countries) as the ultimately beneficiary. This constitutes a problem because member countries are not sufficiently informed about the Project's implementation and have no avenues for providing feedback to the Project.

7. The UNDP is exceptionally well positioned to undertake partner coordination and to seek the harmonization of the efforts of donor in providing assistance to the Peace and Security Department. In this regard, the Evaluation Team noted that communication between the beneficiary, the executing agency and the partners could be significantly improved and, as such, provides considerable dividends to the Project's beneficiary.

## Introduction:

### **Context of the Project**

The UNDP project RAF/02/018 was conceived within the larger framework of the Peace and Security Agenda of the AU of which the key elements are: conflict prevention, management and resolution; support for democracy, good governance, and human rights projects; humanitarian action including refugees, small arms, land mines, demobilization and post-conflict reconstruction; mainstreaming civil society into the activities of the AU; outreach and resource mobilization for the AU peace and security agenda; enhancing cooperation with Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution; and human resources capacity building.

Based on the key priority elements of the AU Peace and Security Agenda and in conformity with the UNDP Second Regional Cooperation Framework for Africa (2002 – 2006) with its emphases on conflict prevention and peace building initiatives, the project was approved in December 2002 initially for a period of four years (2003 -2006) but was extended for one additional year to end of 2007.

An earlier project (RAF/97/028), approved in 1997 and co-financed by the UNDP and Norway, and formally identified as a “Capacity Building” project, had made valuable contributions in enhancing the capacity of the OAU Conflict Management Centre in the areas of conflict prevention and management. The current Project, being financed through a much broader co-funding arrangement involving UNDP, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, has as its overriding objective to “contribute globally to *enhancing the capacity* of the AU for conflict prevention and peace building in Africa” through the provision of technical and financial assistance to the AU Peace and Security Commission. Unlike its predecessor project (RAF/97/028) this Project (RAF/02/018) is more correctly viewed as a Technical and Financial Assistance Project.

### **Objectives of the Terminal Evaluation**

The objectives of the evaluation team were spelled out in an 11-point assessment/evaluation areas reproduced below:

1. Assessment of the overall impact of the support provided under the project to the Peace and Security Directorate of AU in support of the AU peace and security agenda including addressing the capacity problems of the related institutions of the Commission
2. Evaluation of the strategy underlying the design of the project and the extent to which it was effective in facilitating quality delivery of the programme objectives

3. Assessment of activities carried out and the key achievements and shortcomings of the project against its objectives and intended outcomes.
4. Assessment of the management of the project and whether it has met its intended objectives and targets
5. Assessment of constraints if any which may have affected the project implementation and corrective measure undertaken
6. Examination of the partnerships built for the project and to the extent to which they were realized and aided or constrained the delivery of the project objectives.
7. Evaluation of the performance of the project in mobilizing resources and the extent to what it was or was not successful
8. The evaluation mission should record any significant lessons learnt from the implementation of the project that may improve future development of capacity building for peace initiatives in Africa.
9. Looks at the successes and difficulties of the UNDP mission to date, and
10. Sets out some recommendations for how the project can develop its exit strategy, notably in a way that does not destabilise the core work of the AU Peace and Security Department.
11. Review the extent to what the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation were taken into account in the implementation of the project since 2005

**Methodology for the Evaluation:**

The evaluation team studied and analyzed a number of documents made available to it at the start of its 14-day mission to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (see Annex 2 for list of documents). The analysis of the documents was supplemented by consultations with AU Commission including the Commissioner for Peace and Security, The Director of the Peace and Security Department, the Head of the Conflict Management Centre and the Office of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the management of the project, its achievements and shortcomings, the Representative of UNDP to the AU Commission, selected African Ambassadors accredited to the AU Commission: Algeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, Uganda, as well as the representatives of Germany, Sweden, Japan, Canada, Spain, UK, Norway and Netherlands in Addis Ababa, and the project management and staff.

**Composition of the Evaluation Team:** An independent team of three consultants undertook the mission in accordance with the Terms of Reference. The consultants were:

- Mr. Bernard Andrew Nyamwaya Mudho, LL.M., International Lawyer, Advocate, High Court of Kenya, Founding Partner, Mudho & Company, Advocates, former Deputy Head, Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations, New York (1984–1989), Deputy Head, Embassy of Kenya to Belgium and Luxembourg and Mission to the EU, Brussels (1992-1998), Chairman, United Nations Committee on

Conferences (1985 -1989), and Chief Delegate: Kenya Delegation to the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (1980-1987;

- Mr. Markus Koerner, M.Sc, Managing Director, Agora Associates, and Director, Competence Centre for Systemic Project Management, Management Institute, University of St. Gall, and former GTZ Program Head/Team Leader in Ethiopia;
- Dr. Cadman Atta Mills, Economist, Regional Advisor, Office of the Vice President, Africa Region of the World Bank (2005 – 2006); World Bank Sector Manager, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management for Central and West Africa, (2000 – 2005); and World Bank Resident Representative to Senegal, Guinea Bissau, the Gambia, and Cape Verde (1996 -2000).

The Terminal Evaluation Team wishes to express its appreciation to all those who contributed to the successful completion of this assignment. In particular, the Evaluation Team would like to thank the AU, the UNDP Office in Addis Ababa, the Project manager and his Team, Embassies of Partners and African countries in Addis Ababa, as well as the UNDP and UNOPS in New York for the substantive and logistical support they provided to the mission.

### **Main Findings:**

**(1) Assessment of the overall impact of the support provided under the project to the Peace and Security Department of AU:** Consultations with the Project’s main client, the Peace and Security Department of the AU (PSD), leave no doubt that the overall impact of the project (including the predecessor “Capacity Building” project) has been very positive. The project is modest relative to the overall resource envelope potentially available to the PSD. However, the accessibility of the project resources and, especially, the speed with which resources made available under the Project can be mobilized, greatly enhance the value of the Project to the Department in its quest to meet its rapidly expanding mandate and unpredictable challenges, against the backdrop limited capacity provided for in the regular AU budget. Four areas of impact of the project in enabling the PSD to quickly mobilize resource to *enhance* the *capacity* of the Department were identified by the Project beneficiary as being the most positive.

First, the Project has made available to the Directorate human resources (political analysts, IT specialists, interpreters and other short-term contractors.) who now constitute a critical core staff for the PSD. In this context, the Peace and Security Commission officials stressed that, even if the AU had been able to fully staff the institution under the Maputo structure (which is very far from the case), the Commission would have been understaffed and is likely to remain “chronically understaffed” relative to its ever expanding mandate (from a reactive conflict resolution to a proactive conflict prevention stance) and, unfortunately, the prevalence of potential conflict situations in Africa. Concretely, the project has furnished to the PSD a number of key staff who, for all practical purposes, must be considered long-term staff, except in name. They include e.g.

five political analysts and three experts. Moreover, all 21 project staff, except project manager, is by now fully integrated into PSD

Second, the Project through the provision of vastly improved Information and Communication Technology (computerization and training in ICT of commission staff, the establishment of the Local Area Network (LAN), and the Situation Room) has not only improved the productivity of Commission staff, but has enabled better information flow between the Commission and conflict zones through the Embassies of member countries. In addition, the project has enabled the establishment of critical elements of the African Peace and Security Architecture; namely the Peace and Security Council, the Continent-Wide Early Warning System, the Situations room (mentioned above), the Panel of the Wise, the AU-Regional Economic Commission Memorandum of Understanding, and the Common African Defense and Security Policy.

Third, the Project, has enabled the Department of the Peace and Security Commission to concentrate on its core business of Conflict Prevention and Management by taking over a number of routine but essential and time consuming reporting tasks (e.g. preparing financial reports for Partners), as well as in procurement services.

Fourth, the Project provides additional financial resources which can be utilized with a great deal of flexibility. Moreover, the procurement services provided under the Project (through UNDP and UNOPS) make it possible for the Commission to respond quickly to rapidly evolving situations that require the mobilization of resources (human and/or material).

Three areas were identified by officials of the Commission as prime candidates for more and better focus for the Project. Of these, two would appear to fall under the classic “capacity building mandate” of the Project. These were skills development and transfer to the core AU Commission staff, and long term capacity building to improve the Commission’s own structures, procedures, and processes (such as recruitment and procurement) to make them more efficient within the context of the overall AU governance structure. The third area, however, would appear to fall under “capacity enhancement” and would involve assistance to the Commission to make even better use of existing and on-going research and analysis by other institutions (such as the Regional Economic Commissions) and civil society organizations on conflict prevention and maintenance.

**(2) Evaluation of the strategy underlying the design of the project:** and the extent to which it was effective in facilitating quality delivery of the program objectives: The Project opted for a four-pronged “strategy” of:

- Identifying areas of support in Human-resource Development and strengthened information system to improve the analytical capacity of the PSD;

- Assisting the Commission in the establishment of the Peace and Security Council and related institutions and the development of effective linkages between the Council and Regional Security Mechanisms,
- Promoting Institutional capacity building in preventive diplomacy through the establishment and effective operation of the continent-wide Early Warning System, and
- Strengthening of the AU capacity for resource mobilization for its Peace Fund through assisting the AU in developing and implementing an innovative strategy of resource mobilization.

Of these four areas of concentration, the “strategy” in two of the areas would appear to only involve (financial, material) assistance to the setting up of institutions and /or providing infrastructure for improved communication and information sharing between the AU Commission and the Regional Security Mechanisms. There are no indications as to the strategic options that would be pursued by the Project in promoting “Human–Resource Development” and institutional capacity building in preventive diplomacy and resource mobilization for the Peace Fund. The “strategies”, here again, would, therefore, appear to be limited to providing “support” and “assistance” to the AU in the development of (innovative) strategies. In this context, it is important to underline that **the Project does not carry out its own activities. Rather, staff (and materials) procured through the project are put at the disposal of the PSD.** It is the Peace and Security Department that (a) designs and follows up on the implementation of “Project Activities”, (b) defines the work program of the staff, and (c) determines whether “project staff” would be assigned to immediate work program needs or to play a role in long term institutional (capacity) development.

The advantage of a Technical and Financial Assistance Project is that the strategic options to achieve the Project’s objectives are, by definition, “owned” by the Project’s beneficiary (the Commission in this specific case), with the role of the Project being limited to the provision of technical and financial assistance in support of the identified strategies. The disadvantage of a Project designed as “assistance” or “support” program is that it offers very limited scope for the “Project” to have a meaningful “strategic” or “advisory” role in defining project objectives and devising strategies to achieve them. The limited scope is exercised through the governance structure of the project (the Steering Committee which meets too infrequently to be effective) and/or the advisory role that the project beneficiary may permit the project management team to play. There are indications that this advisory role was played by the Project Management Unit to some extent, including the preparation of a (living) document on a strategy for resource mobilization for the Peace and Security Commission and for which the reaction of the project beneficiary is still awaited. Additionally, the Project Management Unit (comprising of the Project Manager, his Deputy, Program Officer, and finance officer) appears to have a complementary role in preparing the Work Plan of the PSD, and in monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the Department’s Work Program and the marshalling and management of donor contributions to the Commission.

The Project defines the Peace and Security Council (as opposed to the AU member countries) as the ultimate beneficiary. Consequently, the governance structure of the Project (the Steering Committee) is designed to facilitate the flow of information on the implementation of Project activities exclusively to the Commission and the Partners involved in the funding and Management of the Project. This constitutes a major problem because member countries are not informed about the Project's implementation nor does the Project receive a regular feedback from the member countries on the usefulness of the Project's contribution such as the Local Area Network, and the activities and deliveries of the Situation Room.

**(3) Assessment of activities carried out and the key achievements and shortcomings of the project against its objectives and intended outcomes:** The evaluation team analyzed project activities using the January – December 2007 Project Work Plan as indicative of the activities supported by the Project since its inception in 2003. The Project's Work Plan was broken down into four main categories (Implementation support to PSC work program), Provision of Infrastructure and ICT, Support to Peace and Security Prevention and Maintenance Analysis; and Training of PSC staff. Most of these activities were not complex (e.g. administration of financial disbursement and recruitment processes), and only few of the activities appeared to require professional inputs from project staff.

Of these categories, Implementation support to the PSC accounted for the bulk of the support (43% of Project costs) and consisted of the recruitment of short term contractors (interpreters, support staff, etc), technical and logistic support, publications of PSC reports, etc. Implementation support, to be distinguished from "stop-gap" measures actually, as can be seen, provided additional resources that enabled the PSC to realize a larger work program than would have been feasible through the resources provided through the regular AU budget supplemented by resources made available under Institution-wide cooperation agreements, such as the EU Process Facility. While the benchmarks for the efficiency of the recruitment processes (and the administration of the financial disbursements) are not available, the Peace and Security Department states that the processes are being handled satisfactorily and are a vast improvement over what would be possible under the AU processes.

The provision of Infrastructure and ICT (14% of Project costs) came in at a distant third and consisted essentially of upgrades to the LAN and purchases of miscellaneous office and recording equipment. Rather than an indication of lack of emphases, however, the low share does reflect that the characteristic of investment in ICT which is bulky and front-loaded. Thus activities in this area are limited to maintenance and upgrades.

The breakdown of expenditures in the 2007 Work Plan of the project also reveals a very healthy support (30% of the Work Plan) for the PSC's analytical and development work on Peace and Security Prevention and maintenance. Activities classified under this rubric include support for the preparation of issues papers (e.g. on strategic peace negotiation

strategy), organization of workshops and retreats (e.g. AU and RECs), reviews and brainstorming.

Training, the category of expenditure that would fall under the classic “capacity building rubric” came in at a very close fourth also at 14% of Project costs, and consisted of the training of PSC staff in ICT, training of PSC officers and Secretarial Staff, as well targeted training of Situation Room and CEWS staff.

The analysis of the breakdown of the Work Plan of the project (see Annex 3) confirms the design of the Project as a technical and financial assistance Project to **enhance the capacity** of the PSC rather than a “capacity building” project. Moreover, to the extent that the AU, in general and the Peace and Security Commission in particular, would be “chronically understaffed and under-budgeted” even with the full complement of staff provided for under the Maputo Structure of the AU, the activities supported by the Project would continue to be very germane and most needed. An “Exit Strategy” for the Project would not involve issues of “sustainability” but a strategy for the provision of comparable (technical and financial) assistance, and hopefully, through mechanisms that offer the same flexibility to the PSC in the use of these resources without compromising **the ownership of the PSC** of project objectives and strategies to achieve these objectives.

**(4) Assessment of the management of the project and whether it has met its intended objectives and targets:** A perusal of the structure of the Project reveals that it indeed has a very light “Management Structure” consisting of the Project Manager and his Deputy (Understudy), assisted by a Program Officer, A Finance Officer, an Administrative Assistant, two bilingual secretaries, a messenger and two drivers. Otherwise all other project staff members (political analysts, specialists and experts, IT and Communication officers, and translators) are Project Staff only in the sense that they are recruited and paid for through project funds. Such a light “Management Structure” would seem to be fully justified in view of the fact that the Project can and does rely on the services of the UNDP and UNOPS for recruitment and procurement services.

The Terms of Reference of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) is either derived as support to the Implementation of the PSC Work Plan or, providing administrative and management support to the PSD, assisting in the design and putting in place effective systems with the PSD for monitoring and evaluating individual projects as required, setting performance targets, measuring outputs, and reporting on their rates of implementation. The assessment of the Project Impact above would seem to indicate that the Project Management structure has not in any way been a hindrance to the attainment of the objectives and may, in fact, contributed significantly to the very positive results achieved so far.

There is no separate TOR for the Project Management Team but to the extent that TOR of the PIU provides for assistance in mobilizing extra-budgetary resources required for

the implementation of the AU's agenda on peace and security, it would be expected that the Management Team would have a significant role in resource mobilization and in partner coordination, especially in facilitating a shared appreciation of the partners of their respective roles and contributions under the aegis of the project. The contribution of the Project Management Unit in preparing a strategy for resource mobilization for the PSD has already been noted above. Moreover, there are indications that the Project has played a crucial role in mobilizing, managing, and reporting on additional resources (such as the 6 million Euro EU capacity building facility) made available to the Peace and Security Department. The role of the Project in partner coordination is analyzed below.

The assessment of the Financial Management of the project by the Terminal Evaluation Team is pending clarification of specific questions posed to the Project Implementation Unit. Nevertheless, the Evaluation Team noted that the fragmented financial management structure of the Project (salaries are managed by AU, most procurement and contractual services by UNOPS, while others are managed by the local UNDP office) makes it difficult to consolidate expenditures and to reconcile expenditures and activities. Moreover, it appeared that it was difficult for the Project Implementation Unit to have a global overview of the implementation of the budget. In view of this, the Evaluation Team feels less than confident in asserting that the Project Management has met its intended objectives and targets in all areas.

**(5) Assessment of Constraints that may have negatively impacted on project implementation and corrective measures undertaken:** While the second phase of the AU-UNDP "Capacity Building" Project for Conflict Prevention and Maintenance put the emphases on technical and financial assistance to the Peace and Security Commission (or capacity enhancement, as we have termed it), the goal of capacity building was not altogether abandoned. Capacity Building was supposed to take place through two different avenues. First, the project, through technical and financial support would, assist the Peace and Security Commission to develop efficient and nimble and administrative (recruitment, disbursement, and procurement) and reporting procedures specific to the Commission within the overall governance structure of the AU. Second, staff recruited by the Project was expected to "transfer skills" to AU counterparts over time so that, in the long run, the Commission would be in a position to perform the tasks and provide the administrative services made possible through the project.

There has been very little "capacity building" and the major constraint has been the inability of the AU to endow itself with the human resources to whom the desired capacity and the skills can be transferred. The reason seems to be principally budgetary: the mismatch between resources available through the assessed budget of the AU and the (ever expanding) mandate of the Union. In short, there is no spare capacity in the AU that can be built or developed over time. On the contrary, Project staff is routinely called upon to perform tasks (for example, political analysts meant to do long term strategic conflict prevention analysis for potential conflict zones doubling as country desk officers) that would normally have to be performed by "regular budget" AU staff. This constitutes a structural constraint for which there are no easy corrective measures over

and beyond the AU undertaking an analysis and implementing solutions of the resource gap issue.

(6) **Examination of the partnerships built for the project and to the extent to which they were realized and aided or constrained the delivery of the project objectives:**

One of the main initial successes of the second phase of the AU-UNDP has been the expansion of the partnership from a limited one (UNDP-Norway) to a much broader co-funding arrangement with the UNDP playing a coordinating role. There have been clear advantages to this partnership arrangement: a significantly increased resource envelope along with an administrative structure (UNDP/UNOPS) that makes for easy access, flexible, and timely use of resources for the beneficiary, the AU Peace and Security Department. In this sense, the Partnership needs to be commended for, not only does the strength of the Project lie in making more resources available for the attainment of the AU Peace and Security mandate, but in putting these resources at the disposal of the Peace of Security Commission with processes that are extremely accessible and flexible thus adapted to the (often) unpredictable demands and mandate of the Commission.

An expanded partnership, however, often increases tensions between partners. This is because it may prove more difficult for all the partners to have full information on the Project's activities as well as a shared appreciation for the respective roles and contribution of each member of the partnership. The Evaluation Team had reason to believe that these tensions may be developing at the level of the Project and it is incumbent on the parties to this Partnership (AU, UNDP, and the other bilateral donors) to ensure these emerging tensions do not develop to such an extent that they constrain the delivery of the Project objectives. In this context, the Evaluation Team noted, with concern, that many donors openly expressed a desire to "pull out" of the Project and rather establish a separate "Technical Assistance Basket" for the PSD. This would appear to be a retrogressive move and would seem to be contradictory to the expressed preference of the Beneficiary to avoid fragmentation of partner support which clearly puts an additional and unnecessary burden on the Peace and Security Department.

In the area of the respective roles of members of the partnership, for example, a number of Partners expressed the desire to see the UNDP play a more "strategic" role at the level of the project rather than to concentrate on implementation and administration of the project. It was not clear to the Evaluation Team as to what was meant by this strategic role, the modality through which the UNDP could play the role (through the PIU or its membership at the Steering Committee of the Project?), and more importantly, how this strategic role could be reconciled with **the necessity for the AU** to not just **own the Project Objectives**, but the Strategies to achieve these objectives as well.

For another example, The Evaluation Team observed that the Project beneficiary very much appreciated the UNDP-UNOPS mode of Project Administration that permit the Peace and Security Department to by-pass the complex AU structures that impede quick decision-making in the areas of recruitment and procurement. However, some partners

had doubts that this is a “value added” that should be preserved over the long stretch. They argue, with some justification, that this should, at best, be viewed as a “stop-gap” measure and, over time, the PSD should improve its own procedures that are efficient and responsive rather than seek to side-step the AU structures. There is common ground that sidestepping the AU governance structure is not a viable long term option. However, there is a danger that partners, in their haste to see an end to perceived stop-gap measures, may seek to channel their support through alternative modes of delivery that are yet to be fully tested for their adaptability to the Peace and Security Commission’s mandate (e.g. the “Process Facility”) or yet to be coherently defined “a partner basket fund to be handled in coordination with other donors”.

**(7) Evaluation of the performance of the project in mobilizing resources and the extent to what it was or was not successful:** There are two ways through which it would appear that the Project has been very successful in strengthening the capacity of the PSD in resource mobilization. The first is easily quantifiable; the much broader partnership and resource envelope (including the \$2.4 million Japanese component on child soldiers) that was mobilized under the second phase of the Project. The project was formulated at an initial budget of \$US 6.4 million has so far received pledged contributions of \$US 7.144 million from the expanded contributing partners, namely UNDP, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, Canada, Spain and the Netherlands.

The second contribution of the Project to resource mobilization is less easily quantifiable but it is clear that the Project (and the staff) can justifiably claim some credit for expanding the capacity of the PSD to mobilize other partner resources which are not channeled through the Project. Among these, we would cite the EU \$6 million capacity building facility with the PSD. In addition, to the extent that project staff often takes over the task of monitoring and reporting of the implementation of Partner Assistance programs, the project directly contributes to the resource mobilization mandate of the Peace and Security Commission.

**(8) The evaluation mission should record any significant lessons learnt from the implementation of the project that may improve future development of capacity building for peace initiatives in Africa.** The Peace and Security Mandate of the African Union is ever expanding and rapidly evolving. Some stakeholders maintain that it would be illusory to expect that the AU would be in a position to meet the challenges of conflict prevention and maintenance through its own (material and financial) resources and budgeted staff positions in the foreseeable future. Neither is it reasonable to expect that the budgeting, recruitment, and procurement procedures of the AU can be sufficiently adapted in the near future to meet the specificity and rapidly evolving demands that conflict situations inevitably impose of the Peace and Security Commission. Thus, (1) a significant portion of any assistance to the AU in the area of Peace and Security would have to involve long-term capacity enhancement (in more simple terms “beefing up” the operational capacity of the Peace and Security Department) financed through extra-budgetary resources, and (2) the resources made available must provide for administrative, recruitment and procurement procedures that are transparent, minimize

reporting costs, and can be very rapidly accessed. This is the lesson that the success of the Project makes amply evident and would also lead to the conclusion that any partnership arrangement that does not address the two issues offers only a partial solution to the obvious capacity constraint of the Peace and Security Council.

The second lesson relates to the fact that, in an environment of scarce resources (seriously constrained operational capacity) and ever increasing and unpredictable but politically sensitive operational challenges, the goal of “capacity building” can easily become ephemeral as there is always the imperative to devote all human and material resources to immediate crisis prevention as opposed to long-term institutional development. This is the singular feature of the “Peace and Security business” driven as it is by “crises” (potential, actual, or post conflict) and it is this fact that separates the Peace and Security Commission from other commissions in the AU. This is not a special pleading for the Peace and Security Commission to develop its own rules, procedures and regulations outside the governance structure of the AU. It is rather to encourage the AU and partners’ appreciation that, in many instances, a pragmatic approach (such as the “outsourcing” of recruitment, disbursement, and the procurement tasks), may be the only option for a rapid and efficient response to an emerging crisis.

The third lesson stems from the contradiction that the vehicle of a “Project” to deliver capacity building support evokes a limited duration effort while, for all practical purposes, the support required by the Peace and Security Commission is likely to be very long term. This has implications, the most serious of which relate to staff of the project. Most of the Project staff has evolved from UNDP contractors (with associated pay scales and benefit packages) to AU contractors paid for by the Project. The status of the Project staff is that of “short-term” contractors with few benefits even though many of them have registered many years of very satisfactory service to the Commission. There is urgent need to review the terms of service of the project staff and to provide contractual terms and benefit packages that must, of necessity be of fixed duration (given the fact of “Project funding”) but recognize that the services of the staff are likely to be protracted in time.

(9) **The successes and difficulties of the UNDP mission to date.** The singular success of the AU-UNDP mission is that the Project has managed to provide critical support (human resources, material, and financial) to the very important day to day analytical, monitoring, and reporting, and advisory roles of the Peace and Security Commission in the area of conflict prevention and maintenance. Moreover, the Project and the partnership framework offer possibilities for resources that can be speedily mobilized to meet the challenges posed by emerging crises.

The project has been able to mobilize the resources to support program objectives and the strategies to achieve them which are clearly owned by the project’s beneficiary. The Peace and Security Department determines the activities that will be carried out with the project’s funding and by “project staff”.

The difficulties faced by the Project are that there is a perception that the Project has failed in its very important mission of long term capacity building. However, there is not a shared comprehension of what could possibly be the role of “the Project” in “long term-capacity building” of the PSD, in transferring skills to “core AU staff”, or in providing “long term strategic advice” on the capacity issues of the Department.

The UNDP is exceptionally well positioned to undertake partner coordination and to seek the harmonization of the efforts of donor in providing assistance to the Peace and Security Department. This is, however, a difficult and challenging task which requires transparency, free flow of information on the side of the coordinator, as well as willingness to be informed by the coordinated. The Evaluation Team had reason to believe that communication between the partners could be improved (the instances for sharing information on the Project such as the Joint (technical) Working Group or the Project Steering Committee do not seem to be performing as desired), while the work loads of partner representatives and frequent turn-over of their representatives at meetings does hamper the efficient sharing and retention of information. Perhaps, partners may want to designate a “lead donor” who would make the commitment to engage the Peace and Security Directorate and the UNDP, and closely follow up on developments, concerns, and debates on the Project’s implementation.

**(10) Sets out some recommendations for how the project can develop its exit strategy, notably in a way that does not destabilise the core work of the AU Peace and Security Department.** The requirement of the Peace and Security Commission for a sizeable flow of extra-budgetary resources that can be flexibly and quickly accessed is very likely to remain in the foreseeable future. An “exit strategy” for the Project that does not destabilize the core work of the Peace and Security Department must, therefore, imperatively involve putting in place alternative strategies that would provide comparable (technical and financial) assistance and, hopefully, through mechanisms that offer the same flexibility to the PSC.

The Evaluation Team also noted that for some partners, an exit strategy for the Project would involve developing the administrative capacity of the Peace and Security Department so that it can provide such services as recruitment, disbursement, and procurement, project implementation monitoring and project status reporting in-house and not be reliant of the Project to provide these services. Additionally, these partners would consider the Project as having outlived its raison d’être when key staff currently “employed by the Project” are absorbed into the regular AU staffing structure.

The team, however, is of the view that out-sourcing some services is not necessarily a sign of administrative capacity weakness but may very well be dictated by pragmatism and efficiency (including cost) considerations. Moreover, absorbing the current “Project staff” into the regular AU staffing structure would in no way resolve the fact that the Peace and Security Commission, given its mandate would be understaffed (and chronically so), even if the full complement of staff provided for in the Maputo structure were to be brought on board.

(11) **Review the extent to what the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation were taken into account in the implementation of the project since 2005.** The Mid-Term Evaluation Team had two set of recommendations covering (i) the next phase of the Project and how it should be redesigned and (ii) and actions to be taken immediately to improve project implementation, management, donor coordination, and Project ownership. The Team for the Terminal Evaluation of the AU-UNDP Project concentrated on the second set of recommendations and, among them, put the emphasis on project implementation and management since donor coordination and project ownership have been extensively commented on above.

On Project Management and Implementation the Evaluation Team noted that many of the recommendations, while germane, went beyond the mandate of the Project or its ability to influence outcomes. Those recommendations, were primarily directed at the AU or unspecified actors (e.g. “in order to enable the AU to effectively undertake the human resource management functions, a well-targeted capacity building effort should be undertaken to strengthen the AU”). Other recommendations (e.g. recommendations 7 and 8) are easier said than done.

The Terminal Evaluation Team can confirm that most of the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation that were directed to the Project Management would appear to have been implemented. In particular, all project staff is not just “assigned” to the various divisions of the Department of Peace and Security (recommendation 3) but is fully integrated into the Work Program of the Department. Moreover, “Project staff” no longer makes a distinction between “assigned responsibility” and “fire-fighting” chores (recommendation 11) because “fire-fighting” or responding to crises is part and parcel of the Peace and Security business.

## Conclusions

1. The overall impact of the project (including the predecessor “Capacity Building” project) has been very positive. The accessibility of the project resources and, especially, the speed with which resources made available under the Project can be mobilized, greatly enhance the value of the Project to the Department in its quest to meet its rapidly expanding mandate and unpredictable challenges, against the backdrop limited capacity provided for in the regular AU budget. Moreover the Project is an operational facility which is of crucial importance to the effective functioning of the core elements of the Peace and Security Architecture of AU, namely the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continent-Wide Early Warning System (CEWS), the Situation Room, Panel of the Wise, the AU/Regional Economic Commissions Memorandum of Understanding, the Common African Defense and Security Policy, and LAN linkages of AU Member States.

2. Unlike the first phase of the Project (which was admittedly a capacity building project), the second phase is a Technical and Financial Assistance Project. The Project objectives and the strategic options to achieve the Project's objectives are "owned" by the Peace and Security Commission. The role of the Project is limited to the provision of technical and financial assistance in support of the identified strategies and the activities as per the Department's Work Program. There is only a very limited scope for the "Project" to have a meaningful "strategic" or "advisory" role in defining project objectives and devising strategies to achieve them.

3. The second phase of the Project does not involve "capacity building" in its traditional meaning except in the very narrow sense of the occasional training of Peace and Security Department staff that may be funded by resources made available by the Project. However, the Evaluation Team noted that in an environment of scarce resources (seriously constrained operational capacity) and ever increasing and unpredictable but politically sensitive operational challenges, the goal of "capacity building" can easily become ephemeral as there is always the imperative to devote all human and material resources to immediate crisis prevention as opposed to long-term institutional development.

4. One of the main initial successes of the second phase of the AU-UNPD has been the expansion of the partnership from a limited one (UNDP-Norway) to a much broader co-funding arrangement with the UNDP playing a coordinating role. There have been clear advantages to this partnership arrangement: a significantly increased resource envelope along with an administrative structure (UNDP/UNOPS) that makes for easy access, flexible, and timely use of resources for the beneficiary, the AU Peace and Security Department. In the light of this the Evaluation Team concluded that it might be a retrogressive move for some partners to "pull out" of the Project and to establish a separate "Technical Assistance Basket" for the Peace and Security Department. This would also be contradictory to the expressed preference of the Beneficiary to avoid fragmentation of partner support which clearly puts an additional and unnecessary burden on the Peace and Security Department.

5. The requirement of the Peace and Security Department for a sizeable flow of extra-budgetary resources that can be flexibly and quickly accessed is very likely to remain in the foreseeable future. An "exit strategy" for the Project that does not destabilize the core work of the Peace and Security Department must, therefore, imperatively involve putting in place alternative strategies that would provide comparable (technical and financial) assistance and, hopefully, through mechanisms that offer the same flexibility to the PSC.

6. The Project defines the Peace and Security Council (as opposed to the member countries) as the ultimately beneficiary. Consequently, the governance structure of the Project (the Steering Committee) is designed to facilitate the flow of information on the implementation of Project activities exclusively to the Commission and the Partners involved in the funding and Management of the Project. This constitutes a major problem because member countries are not informed about the Project's implementation.

7. The design of the Project and the Partnership Framework offer possibilities for resources that can be speedily mobilized to meet the challenges posed by emerging crises. The UNDP is exceptionally well positioned to undertake partner coordination and to seek the harmonization of the efforts of donor in providing assistance to the Peace and Security Department. This is, however, a difficult and challenging task which requires transparency, free flow of information on the side of the coordinator, as well as willingness to be informed by the coordinated. The Evaluation Team had reason to believe that communication between the beneficiary, the executing agency and the partners could be significantly improved and, as such, would provide considerable dividends to the Project's beneficiary.

# Annex 1

## Terms of Reference of the Evaluation Mission

### **CONSULTANCY FOR A TERMINAL EVALUATION OF THE UNDP SUPPORT TO AU PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA PROJECT: RAF/02/018**

#### **Terms of Reference**

#### 1: BACKGROUND

The UNDP Second Regional Cooperation Framework for Africa (2002-2006) (RCF 2) which complements the Global Cooperation Framework focuses on among other priorities the preventing conflict, peace building and managing disasters. UNDP support to preventing conflict and peace building emanates from this framework and project RAF/02/018 was conceived within the larger framework of the Peace and Security Agenda of the AU of which the following are key elements

- Conflict prevention, management and resolution, including peace support initiatives under the Peace and Security Council;
- Institutional support for the Peace and Security Council;
- Support for democracy, good governance, and human rights projects;
- Humanitarian action including refugees, small arms, land mines, demobilization and post-conflict reconstruction;
- Mainstreaming civil society into the activities of the AU including through support to the envisaged ECOSOCC of the AU;
- Outreach and resource mobilization for the AU peace and security agenda;
- Enhancing cooperation with Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution; and
- Human resources capacity building.

#### 2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION:

Based on the foregoing priorities identified by the AU and on the conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives of the RCF2 of UNDP-Africa and in synergy with its Preparatory Assistance Project in Support of the Transition to the African Union the UNDP Support to AU Peace and Security Agenda project was approved in December 2002 initially for a period of four years (2003-2006) but was extended for one additional year to end 2007.

The project was revised in 2005 with the addition of a \$2m programme component funded by Japan for the training of former child soldiers in the Great Lakes region. In addition, a mid-term evaluation of the project was conducted in 2005. The results of the evaluation are contained in the report that will be made available as a background document for this terminal evaluation

The project is financed through a \$10m co-sharing arrangement-under which UNDP is contributing \$2.5 m and the balance provided by Germany, UK, Sweden, Spain, Canada, Norway, Japan and Netherlands. The project seeks to provide technical and financial assistance to the AU aimed at enhancing its capacity for conflict prevention, security and peace building in Africa.

Activities are focused on: (i) capacity building of the Peace and Security Directorate (PSD); (ii) ensuring the effective operation of the Peace and Security Council; (iii) strengthening institutions and programmes for preventive diplomacy, peace and security; and (iv) developing and executing a strategy for creating greater awareness of AU efforts and raising resources for peace and security and v) Training of former child soldiers in the Great Lakes region

### 3. PROJECT INTENDED OUTCOMES

Four outcomes were identified for the project:

- An effective Peace and Security Directorate (PSD) with capabilities to collect and analyze information on conflict situations and contribute to policy development as well as give effective support to the AU Commission and the Peace and Security Council in peace and security initiatives.
- A consolidated and effectively operational AU Peace and Security Council.
- Strengthened institutional capacities within the AU Commission for preventive diplomacy, peace and security.
- Enhanced capacity for outreach and resource mobilization for the AU peace and security agenda.

### 4. STRATEGY

Four interrelated strategies were proposed for the project-namely to identify practical areas of support in human resources development and strengthened information systems to improve the analytical capacity of the PSD, to assist the Commission in the establishment of the PSC and related institutions, and in the development of effective linkages between the Council and Regional Security Mechanisms, institutional capacity building in preventive diplomacy and strengthening of the AU capacity for resource mobilization for its Peace Fund.

### 5. EXPECTED OUTPUTS AND BENEFICIARIES

The principal expected output of the project was more effective operation of the AU peace and security framework at all levels. The direct and immediate beneficiaries of the project are members of the PSC and related institutions, African embassies in Addis Ababa and the PSD as well as countries of the Great Lakes region. Others who will benefit directly from it include the regional security mechanisms; research institutions and civil society. Indirect beneficiaries include all African regional groupings (RECs).

### 6. PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE.

The project is managed under a supervisory structure of the AU, UNDP and UNOPS as the executing agency and AU as implementing agency. A Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was established. Under a special agreement and in order to deepen ownership, the personnel component of the Project was hived out to AU Commission for execution. The project staff report to and remain responsible to the AU in their day-to-day discharge of their functions relating to its peace and security agenda. There is a Steering Committee, which provides overall guidance and direction for project implementation, approve work plans and ensure the successful implementation of the project. It is composed of representatives from AU, UNDP, UNOPS and the participating donor countries.

### 7. OBJECTIVE OF THE EVALUATION

The present project evaluation is being undertaken as a Terminal evaluation of the Project. The objective of the evaluation will be the following-

12. Assessment of the overall impact of the support provided under the project to the Peace and Security Directorate of AU in support of the AU peace and security agenda including addressing the capacity problems of the related institutions of the Commission
13. Evaluation of the strategy underlying the design of the project and the extent to which it was effective in facilitating quality delivery of the programme objectives
14. Assessment of activities carried out and the key achievements and shortcomings of the project against its objectives and intended outcomes.
15. Assessment of the management of the project and whether it has met its intended objectives and targets
16. Assessment of constraints if any which may have affected the project implementation and corrective measure undertaken
17. Examination of the partnerships built for the project and to the extent to which they were realized and aided or constrained the delivery of the project objectives.
18. Evaluation of the performance of the project in mobilizing resources and the extent to what it was or was not successful
19. The evaluation mission should record any significant lessons learnt from the implementation of the project that may improve future development of capacity building for peace initiatives in Africa.
20. Looks at the successes and difficulties of the UNDP mission to date, and
21. Sets out some recommendations for how the project can develop its exit strategy, notably in a way that does not destabilise the core work of the AU's Peace and Security Department.
22. Review the extent to what the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation were taken into account in the implementation of the project since 2005

## 8. CONSULTANCY ACTIVITIES

The evaluation team shall undertake the following activities related to their mission.

- Background study on the project,
- Design of evaluation methodology and tools.
- Consultations with AU Commission including the Commissioner for Peace and Security, The Director of the Peace and Security Directorate, The Head of the Conflict Management Centre and the Office of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the management of the project, its achievements and shortcomings.
- Consultations with the Representative of UNDP to the AU Commission.
- Consultation with selected African Ambassadors accredited to the AU Commission.
- Consultations with the representatives of Germany, Sweden, Japan, Canada, Spain, UK, Norway and Netherlands in Addis Ababa.
- Consultation with the project management and staff
- Consultation with RBA and UNOPS in New York,
- Preparation and presentation of the report to RBA

## 9: EVALUATION OUTPUT

The mission is expected to produce a report containing a full evaluation of the project activities (design, formulation, execution, management.) and recommendations for the future based on the relevance, performance and achievements of the project. The report will address any

specific issue that is relevant to the findings and indicate lessons learnt from the project experience. The report will also indicate the methodology used for the evaluation- for example desk review, questionnaire, and interviews and field consultations.

The mission will present its preliminary conclusions to the AU, UNDP, donor partners before its departure from Addis Ababa. It will endeavour to reflect the observations/feedback received in the Final Report which will be presented to UNDP-Africa- and in turn distributed to the partners.

#### 10: EVALUATION RESOURCES.

The project management in Addis Ababa will furnish to the evaluation mission following base resources documents-

- Project Document
- Annual work plans and reports to the project Steering Committee
- The AU Peace and Security Agenda Programme document
- The Protocol on the establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council
- The Training of the ex-child soldiers in the Great lakes region project document
- The mid-term evaluation report of the project undertaken in 2005
- Any other relevant documentation.

#### 11. PROFESSIONAL REQUIREMENTS

- Advanced degree in political sciences, law, and development studies, sociology, philosophy or other relevant study;
- Professional experience in project design, implementation and evaluation;
- Project evaluation experience related to the issue of peace and security and governance programmes desirable.
- Project evaluation experience in Africa,
- Experience with UNDP regional programmes preferable
- Proficiency in the English language is necessary.

#### 12: COMPOSITION OF THE EVALUATION TEAM

An independent team of two consultants will undertake the evaluation representing respectively AU, UNDP and UNOPS as well as the donor partners.

#### 13: DURATION AND SCHEDULE

The mission is scheduled to take place during the months of July and August 2007 for a period of fourteen working days- inclusive of report writing time. AU, Project management staff and UNOPS will prepare the evaluation programme.

The mission will be funded from the project resources

#### 14. LOGISTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE EVALUATION

- The AU will designate its focal points and provide any logistical and administrative support that may be needed for the success of the mission.
- UNOPS will be responsible for contracting, travel arrangements and payment of DSA and other relevant fees due to the consultants.
- UNDP and UNOPS will bear the primary responsibility of organizing and managing the evaluation process.

- The UNDP Africa Senior Governance Advisor will brief and debrief the mission (where feasible) and provide the mission with any pertinent information that would assist its work.
- The UNDP Representative to the African Union will facilitate the work of the mission on the ground. He will liaise with AU and the other partners to ensure the smooth execution of the mission.

#### 15: FEES

The consultants will be paid consultancy fees based on UNDP scales, their experience and expertise and subject to presentation of a satisfactory report.

## **Annex 2**

### **List of Documents Consulted**

Beginning with the basic document: The Africa Union/United Nations Development Programme – Project Document (RAF/02/018), the documents consulted included:

- (1) The Report of the Mid-Term Evaluation Team of RAF/02/018;
- (2) The Peace and Security Department Programme Implementation Plan for the Period January – December 2007;
- (3) Minutes of the Task Force Meeting of the AU-UNDP Capacity Building Partnership Project , RAF/02/018 Held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 29 May 2007;
- (4) Minutes of the AD-HOC Steering Committee Meeting of the AU-UNDP Capacity Building Partnership Project , RAF/02/018 Held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 04 May 2007;
- (5) Minutes of the Fifth Steering Committee Meeting of the AU-UNDP Capacity Building Partnership Project , RAF/02/018 Held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 31 January 2007;
- (6) Minutes of the Fourth Steering Committee Meeting of the AU-UNDP Capacity Building Partnership Project , RAF/02/018 Held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 08 September 2007;
- (7) Minutes of the Third Steering Committee Meeting of the AU-UNDP Capacity Building Partnership Project , RAF/02/018 Held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 09 July 2004;
- (8) Minutes of the Second Steering Committee Meeting of the AU-UNDP Capacity Building Partnership Project , RAF/02/018 Held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 19 September 2003;
- (9) Report on the Implementation of Project RAF/02/018 Activities for the Period September 2005 –December 2006 prepared in January 2007;
- (10) Report on the Implementation of Project RAF/02/018 Activities for the Period July 2004 – June 2005 prepared in June 2005;
- (11) AU/UNDP Project RAF/02/018 Work Plan for January – December 2007;
- (12) AU/UNDP Project RAF/02/018 Final Work Plan for January 2006 – December 2007;
- (13) AU/UNDP Project RAF/02/018 Work Plan for January – December 2005;
- (14) AU/UNDP Project RAF/02/018 Work Plan for January – December 2004;
- (15) AU/UNDP Project RAF/02/018 Work Plan for October 2003 – September 2004.

## Annex 3

### Analysis of 2006 Work Programme

Objective	SC/Benchmark	Implementation Support		Capacity Building						Remarks
		(Staff and Finance)		Infrastructure & ICT		Analysis and Development		Training		
		Description	Costs	Description	Costs	Description	Costs	Description	Costs	
1. Effective PSD	1.1 Enhanced PSD capacities for implementation of project activities SC/Benchmark 1.2 Human capacities for implementing AU's agenda for P&S strengthened	1.1.6 Local Short-Term contracts for PSD	10,000	1.1.4 Purch of office equipment	10,000			1.1.1 ICT Training 30 Staff	project staff	
				1.1.5 Upgrade LAN	15,000			1.1.3 Training for Officers within PSD	10,000	
				1.1.7 Video Conf. System	40,000					
		1.3 AU caps in conflict mgmt & resolution strengthened	5,000	1.3.2 Database of special envoys, force commanders, etc.	project staff	1.3.3 Issue paper on strategic peace negotiation strategy	project staff			
				1.3.5 UN Peace Bldg Portal	25,000	1.3.4 Modalities for standby-by-facility for AU response to peace negotiation	project staff			
2. PSC operation	2.1 PSC with Panel of Wise in place	2.1.1 Financial and technical support for institutions of PSC	15,000	2.1.5 Office Equipment	10,000			2.1.3 Training of PSC secretariat, NY	?	
		2.1.2 Four interpreters	100,000	2.1.6 Recording equipment	1,000			2.1.4 Training of PSC secretariat, OSCE	30,000	
	2.2 Enhanced relations AU - RECs						2.2.1 Retreat in Kenya for AU and RECs	120,000		
							2.2.2 Legal review of MoU AU-RECs	20,000		
		2.3 Panel of the Wise	50,000	2.3.1 Three Support staff Panel						
3. Inst'l caps for diplomacy, peace and security	3.1 Early Warning Systems	3.1.1 Three support staff SitRoom	40,000					3.1.2 Training SitRoom staff	60,000	
								3.1.3 Training CEWS staff	10,000	
	3.2 Peace Supp Ops, ASF						3.2.1 Task Team to develop SOP for Maritime and Air operations	50,000		
							3.2.2 Workshop with Afr. Peacekeeping Training APSta	30,000		
							3.2.3 Brainstorming on rules for MSC	20,000		
	3.3 Role of women in AU P&S strengthened	20,000	3.3.1 Af Wom Comm P&D, technical and logistical support		3.3.2 Database of Women peace makers	project staff				by project staff
	3.4 Civil Society participation	15,000	3.4.1 Support to CS programmes							
	3.6 Post conflict recovery	AU DDR programmes (DDR, Training Women)								
3.6.2 Two staff to manage AU PCR Web Page		29,000								
3.7 AU / RECS for SALW	50,000	3.7.1 Meetings of regional SALW bodies								
4. Enhanced cap for outreach and res. mobilisation	4.1 Greater Awareness of the role of AU reg. P&S in Africa promoted	10,000	4.1.2 publish magazine etc	10,000	4.1.1 Web page on Peace and Security					
<b>Total</b>		<b>344,000</b>		<b>111,000</b>		<b>240,000</b>		<b>110,000</b>		805,000
		43%		14%		30%		14%		100
Various Salaries		660,000								